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Money Stock Control4
by ALBERT E. BURGER
In early September 1972 the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored a conference entitled
“Controlling Monetary Aggregates II: The Implementation.” A series of articles was presented
which analyzed problems arising from the implementation of monetary policy. The following arti-
cle is an abridged version of one paper presented at this conference. Much of the technical ma-
terial has been omitted from this abridged version with the intent of conveying in concise form
the main ideas and conclusions of the article. The complete article, including comments by the
discussant, Professor James Duesenberry, will be published in 1973 by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston as part of its Monetary Conference series. The forthcoming publication also will
contain the other papers presented at the Conference.
rtn
I HE FEDERAL RESERVE stated in 1960, when
it began publishing a separate and distinct money
stock series, that:
The amount of money in existence and changes
in this amount influence the course of economic
developments.
The Federal Reserve System has primary respon-
sibility for regulating the total volume of money
available to meet the public’s demands.’
Over the next ten years a major controversy
developed over whether the Federal Reserve recog-
nized or placed enough emphasis on its responsibility
for controlling the growth of the money stock. The re-
lated question of which operating strategy to follow
in controlling the money stock was pushed to the
background.
Economists can argue at great lengths over the
extent to which the Federal Reserve tried to control
money in the past. However, one thing is clear; since
early 1970, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) has moved in several stages to a position
of placing more emphasis on controlling the money
stock, relative to other intermediate objectives, than
had previously been the case.2 Along with this de-
velopment, there has been increased scrutiny of alter-
native short-term operating strategies and analysis of
problems involved in controlling growth rates of mon-
etary aggregates.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Anatol
Balbach and Robert Rasche for their many comments on
this study.
1
”A New Measure of the Money Supply,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin (October 1960), p. 1102.
2
The Federal Open Market Committee consists of the seven
members of the Federal Reserve Board of Covernors and
In this paper the control of one monetary aggre-
gate, the money stock, is considered. It is assumed
that the Federal Open Market Committee has chosen
a growth path for the money stock that is expected to
be consistent with its policy objectives for output,
employment, and prices. All the problems relating
to how this growth path for money was chosen are
ignored. The control problem is to use open market
operations to achieve that growth path for money
This involves predicting the effects of open market
operations on the money stock. Because of informa-
tion lags and random weekly fluctuations in money,
the Federal Reserve does not aim open market opera-
tions directly at the money stock, but picks an operat-
ing target intermediate between open market opera-
tions and the money stock. The two main candidates
for this operating target have been money market
conditions, chiefly represented by the Federal funds
rate, and some reserve aggregate.
The Control Procedure
A general reserve aggregate-multiplier approach is
used here to derive a control procedure the Federal
Open Market Committee could use to achieve a
given growth path for money. The link between the
five of the twelve Federal Reserve Bank Presidents. The
President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank is a per-
manent voting member of the Committee and is its Vice-
Chairman, All other Federal Reserve Bank Presidents attend
the meetings and present their views, but votes may be cast
by only four of these Presidents, who serve as voting mem-
bers for one-year terms on a rotating basis. The Committee
meets about every four weeks to discuss economic trends
and to decide upon the future course of open market opera-
tions. The decisions on the exact timing and amount of daily
buying and selling operations of securities in fulfilling the
Committee’s directive are the responsibility of the Account
Manager at the Trading Desk of the New York Bank.
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Tabi I
Sources and Uses of the Net Source Base
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the procedure
set forth in this article. In its day-to-day operations
~This is not the only approach that could be used to address
the problem of controlling the money stock, Other economists
within the Federal Reserve have attacked the problem from
a different approach. lames Pierce and Thomas Thompson
have studied the problem with their monthly money market
model using the Federal funds rate as the control variable.
See James L. Pierce and Thomas D. Thompson, Some Issues
in Controlling the Stock of Money” (paper prepared for the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference on Controllin
Monetary Aggregates II: The Implementation ). Richar
Davis has used a reduced form relationship that takes the
demand deposit component of the money stock as the varia-
ble to be explained. His reduced form equation includes
nonborrowed reserves (or altematively the Federal funds
rate), business sales, Covernment deposits and a variable to
capture the effects of Regulation Q. His results are discussed
in the Pierce-Thompson paper.
4
The specific procedure presented in this paper is designed
within the framework of a non-linear money supply hypothe-
sis developed by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer:
1+k
(r—~b ) (1+t+d )+k
where k, t, and d, respectively, are the ratios of currency
held by the public, time deposits, and U. S. Government
demand deposits at commercial banks to the demand deposit
component of the money stock. The variables r and b.
respectively, are the ratios of bank reserves and member bank
borrowings to commercial bank deposit liabilities (excluding _________
interbank deposits), See Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer,
“Liquidity Traps for Money, Bank Credit, and Interest Rates,”
Journal of Political Economy (January/February 1968), pp.
1-37, and Albert F. Burger, The Money Supply Process
(Belmont, California Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971).
reserve aggregate — total reserves, non-
borrowed reserves, the monetary base,
or some variant of these— and the
money stock is called a multiplier. The
money stock control procedure involves
predicting the effect on the money
stock of setting the reserve aggregate
at a given value.a
The determination of the money
stock is summarized in a multiplier-
base expression of the following
form:4
= mB
where “M1” is the money stock
(demand deposits plus currency held
by the nonbank public), “B” is the
net source base, and “m” is the
money multiplier. The net source
base (B) can be controlled by Fed-
eral Reserve open market operations.
Sometimes this base concept is re-
ferred to as the nonborrowed base
to denote that member bank borrow-
ings are excluded. The net source
base Is taken as the control variable in
m=
this would be the variable toward which the Desk
would primarily direct its open market operations.5
On a daily basis, the Federal Reserve has informa-
tion on the value of the previous day’s net source
base (B). This information comes from totaling the
sources of the base, as shown in Table I. Special care
should be taken to distinguish between the sources
and uses of the base. In order to measure the base,
the Desk does not have to estimate excess reserves
and currency. This would be the case only if the
Manager of the System Open t~arketAccount had to
rely solely on information about the uses of the base.
By collecting data on the sources of the base, which
come from the books of the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury, a more accurate estimate can be obtained
on a short-run basis.
The money multiplier (m) is the connecting linkbe-
tween the net source base and money stock. Changes
in the multiplier reflect portfolio decisions by banks
and the public, Treasury actions, and Federal Reserve
policy actions such as changes in reserve requirements
and the discount rate. The multiplier is not constant.
Therefore, under this proposed procedure, the Federal
‘The Manager of the System Open Market Account may be
referred to as the “Account Manager” or the “Desk,” mean-
ing the Trading Desk of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank.
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Reserve must estimate the multiplier to determine
how much base to supply to achieve a desired path
for the money stock.
.FOTiCaSh.n~L~ the tew /~9 M~u1%!.icr
The procedure used in this paper to forecast the
money multiplier takes as inputs only those variables
that the Federal Reserve could be assumed to know
without error. The two major independent variables
used to forecast the next month’s money multiplier
are the lagged 3-month moving average of the multi-
plier and the percent change in the Treasury bill rate
in the previous month.°This procedure is an extension
of the procedure used in a previous article co-authored
with Lionel Kalish and Christopher Babb. The major
modification is to remove the reserve adjustment mag-
nitude and include the lagged percentage change in
the Treasury bill rate.7
In essence, this is a very mechanical method that
does not attempt to incorporate any information the
Federal Reserve might have concerning expected
movements of key factors such as Treasury deposits
in the forecast month, Therefore, the results of simu-
lations based on this procedure should not be viewed
as an indication of the best control the Federal Re-
serve could attain. Instead, they provide a standard
against which other procedures could be evaluated.
Any alternative procedure should be able to perform
at least as well as this simple, mechanical method.
Sirn~We;tv~g the Control. ithterCi.tre
The forecasting horizon and the net source base
target period are set at one month. For example, at
the start of each month, a money multiplier for that
month is forecast, and a new setting for the net
source base is determined. This procedure was simu-
lated over the 96-month period, 1964-71. The fore-
casted multiplier times the actual net source base for
each month gives the money stock the Federal Re-
serve would have expected to achieve if it had been
6
The regression equation used to forecast the multiplier was
estimated using not seasonally adjusted data. The coefficients
used to forecast each montWs multiplier were estimated by
least squares using the previous 36 months’ observations.
Each month the coefficients were re-estimated by adding the
most recent month and dropping the first month of the
previous 36 observations. In making the forecasts put—i was
added, where ut—i is the lagged value of the error in the
estimate of the money multiplier and pi sthe correlation
coefficient for consecutive error terms in the equation during
the sample period.
7
Albert E. Burger, Lionel ICalish III, and Christopher T. Babb,
“Money Stock Control and Its Implications for Monetary
Policy, tlils Review (October 1971), pp. 6-22.
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using this procedure.8 The results of this exercise and
statistics relevant for evaluating these results are given
in the Appendix at the end of this article. Since no
forecasting errors are involved in the independent
variables, the results of these simulations indicate how
well the procedure would have worked over the
1964-71 period.
The evaluation of the performance of a money
stock control procedure should not be based solely on
monthly errors. For example, a one-half percent error
in one month, converted to an annual rate becomes a
6 percent error. This does not necessarily imply that
using this method would result in that magnitude of
error over a relevant control period. Errors resulting
from the simulation do not tend to accumulate, and
positive errors are offset by negative ones. The mean
forecasting error is $140 million and the mean percent
forecasting error is less than 0.1 percent; this indicates
that the procedure, on average, does not substantially
over- or underestimate the money stock associated
with a set value of the net source base,
Comparing consecutive 3-month moving averages
of the money stock resulting from simulating the con-
trol procedure to actual money over the 1964-71
period results in a mean percent error of .07 percent
and an absolute mean percent error of 0.31 percent.
In other words, if the desired level of the money
stock can be expressed as a moving average for
3-month periods, the procedure should permit its
achievement with only small errors.
Another means of analyzing the effectiveness of the
control procedure is to compare the expected growth
rates of the money stock resulting from simulating the
control procedure with actual growth rates of the
money stock. The simulated monthly values of the
money stock are what the FOMC would have ex-
pected from setting the net source base at its historical
values if it had been using this procedure to forecast
the money multiplier.
In this way, an analysis can be made of the effec-
tiveness of the control procedure at times when there
were marked reversals in the growth rate of the
money stock. During the period 1964-71 there were at
least 6 marked changes in the growth rate of the
money stock. Table II presents a comparison of actual
growth rates of money and the growth rates that the
8
The forecasted not seasonally adjusted money multiplier was
multiplied by the actual not seasonally adjusted net source
base to obtain not seasonally adjusted money (NSAM). Then
NSAM was multiplied by the implicit seasonal factor for that
month (computed by dividing seasonally adjusted money by
not seasonally adjusted money) to obtain the seasonally ad-
justed money stock.
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Table It
Actual Compared to





Average of Growth Rote Control
3 Months Ended of Money
2
Procedure’
Moy ‘66-Dec. ‘66 0.2’’ 1.1
Dec. ‘66 -ian. ‘69 7.2 7.1
Jan. ‘69- Feb. ‘70 3.4 3.7
Feb. ‘70- Dec. ‘70 5.4 5.0
Dcc. ‘70. July 71 9.4 9.5
July ‘71 - Dec. 71 2.4 3.2
‘Prri,,I wt—•’t’eh.,.’t’n,,’, Ihi b,’~i..ura’g,,Ih’a,it ch.o:rt’ in The grnwt
the lnr,r,c_’. —t:a’l.
ucmi.,l ‘an’—.
“I ,ar.i,.jI,”l i,in~,:tr’ini: .i.,r,,u.
1
h a’.r”ng,’’.’,,rioal
iiiit:ii! ‘ii bet 1,,’t—n,,,r’rh a’ci’ngt’ ,,t to, nt—It’d ,r’.nt~ ri lhr’’l’nI’uLI
F()\IC would have expecti.’tl if it had been using the
control procedure over these periods.
For example, beginning in mid-1966 the growth rate
of money slowed markedly. By setting the net source
base at its historical values, the FOMC would have
expected, given the forecasts of the money multiplier,
that the money stock would have grown at a 1.1 per-
cent annual rate from the average of 3 months ending
May 1966 to the average of 3 months ending Decem-
ber 1966. The actual growth rate of the money stock
over this same period was 0.2 percent. In early 1967
the FOMC moved to a much more expansionary pol-
icy. Simulating the control procedure results in an
expected growth rate of the money stock of 7.1 per-
cent from the average of 3 months ending December
1966 to the average of 3 months ending January 1969.
The actual growth rate of money associated with set-
ting the net source base at its historical values was
7.2 percent over this period.
As shown in Table II, the FOMC would also have
been able to achieve the growth path of money
through the slowdown in 1969, the renewed growth
in 1970, the acceleration in the first half of 1971, and
the sharp slowdown in the last half of 1971. These
results indicate that even if the FOMC sought very
marked reversals in the growth of money, over at
least a 6-month period it could quite accurately
achieve the growth of money it desired by using the
procedure presented in this article.
Stock: tJonirot
The 1964-71 period presented an especially difficult
period for money stock control. A significant part of
this difficulty was introduced by Federal Reserve
actions. During this 8-year period there were several
major reversals in the direction of the influence of
Federal Reserve policy actions on the money stock.°
In addition, reserve requirements were changed 7
times and lagged reserve requirements were intro-
duced in this period. The Federal Reserve also per-
mitted Regulation Q ceiling rates to frequently re-
strain banks from responding in a competitive manner
to changes in market rates.1°
The money stock control procedure outlined above
is not designed to capture the initial effects of these
actions by the Federal Reserve. Since a lagged 3-
month moving average of the multiplier is used, a
sharp reversal of policy may cause a change in the
multiplier that is not immediately captured by the pro-
cedure used to forecast the multiplier. For example,
at times of sharp reversals in the growth rate of the
money stock relatively larger errors occur for a short
period. After mid-1966 the forecasting procedure sub-
stantially over-estimates the multiplier; the opposite
occurs in early 1967. Also, a similar tendency seems
to have been in effect in 1971 as forecasting errors
tended to be negative in the first half of the year and
positive in the second half. The exact size and direc-
tion of this effect depends upon a number of factors.
However, given the characteristics of the procedure
for forecasting the money multiplier, it does seem
likely that a substantial change in the thrust of policy
actions on the money stock will introduce additional
problems for accurately predicting the initial influ-
ence of open market actions on the money stock.
The results shown in Table II indicate that through
the use of this procedure the FOMC could quite
accurately achieve sharp changes in the growth path
of money over a longer period of time. The same
results point out that, in the initial stages of a marked
change in the desired growth rate of the money stock,
the Federal Open Market Committee should not aban-
don the procedure just because they initially observe
larger than average monthly errors. However, given
that the policymakers are also concerned with large
movements in short-term interest rates, large monthly
°Policy actions resulted in an acceleration of the base from
late 1965 through mid-1966 followed by a deceleration of
the base throngh the end of 1966. This was followed by a
renewed acceleration during 1967-68, followed by a decel-
eration in 1969, then a more rapid growth in 1970. A rapid
acceleration in the growth rate of the base over the first
half of 1971 again was followed by a rapid deceleration
in the second half of 1971,
t0
The secondary market yield on large 6-month CDs ex-
ceeded the Regulation Q ceiling rate in the 8-month period
from June 1966 throngh January 1967, the 9-month period
from November 1967 through July 1968, and the 24-month
period from November 1968 through October 1970.
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errors may make the task of returning to the desired
money stock path more difficult. The author conjec-
tures that most methods would tend to show relatively
larger errors at times when the target growth of money
is markedly changed. Again, the point should be em-
phasized that it is the performance of the procedure
over a period of several months or longer that is
crucial.
With regard to reserve requirements, there is clear
evidence that reserve requirement changes create sub-
stantial difficulties for predicting the growth path of
money with this technique. The root mean square
forecasting error for months when reserve require-
rnents were changed and the following month is about
63 percent larger than for the whole sample period,
$1.74 billion compared to $1.07 billion.’1
If reserve requirements are raised, the money multi-
plier is reduced, and hence the money stock resulting
from simulating this procedure would be expected
to exceed actual money, resulting in positive errors.
In July and September 1966 reserve requirements
were raised and the period July - October 1966 en-
compasses some of the largest positive errors of the
sample period. Likewise, large positive errors occur
following the raising of reserve requirements in mid-
January 1968 and mid-April 1969. Several of the larg-
est negative errors followed lowering of reserve re-
quirements in March 1967 and October 1970.
Although the exact magnitude of the influence of
Regulation Q ceilings is difficult to isolate empirically,
it can be conjectured from a theoretical analysis that
this impediment added to the errors in money stock
control. For example, as market interest rates rise
above Regulation Q ceiling rates, this results in a rapid
decline in the growth of time deposits, hence affecting
the t-ratio in the money multiplier, and therefore
influencing the growth of the money stock.
niponson of RPI)s I VU! PU? .151?! S:OU:rC11
~ (I)peralin.g Jargate
Prior to 1972 a key element of open market strategy
had been use of a configuration of measures of money
market conditions as operating guides for the Man-
ager of the System Open Market Account. At the
1m
Most reserve requirement changes occurred in the middle
of a month. Hence, their potential influence carried over
to the following month. The dates of reserve requirement
changes and the amount of reserves released or absorbed
are as follows: July 1966 ($420 million), September 1966
($445 million), March 1967 (-—$850 million), January 1968
($550 million), April 1969 ($660 million), introduction of
a 10 percent marginal reserve requirement on certain for-
eign borrowings by banks in October 1969 (8400 million),
October 1970 (—$500 million).
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start of 1972 the Federal Open Market Committee
began a series of steps that moved open market oper-
ating strategy decidedly closer to a reserve aggregate
approach. At the February 15 FOMC meeting, the
Committee adopted, as its reserve aggregate target,
reserves available to support private nonbank deposits
(RPDs), defined specifically as total member bank
reserves less those required to support Government
and net interbank depositsJ2
The move toward guiding open market operations
more by an RPD target than an interest rate target is
a major constructive development, especially to those
individuals who emphasize the System’s role in con-
trolling the growth of the money stock. However,
RPDs are only one among several reserve aggregates
that might serve the same purpose.
In choosing a reserve aggregate as an operating
target for controlling money it seems desirable to
select one that (1) has the most predictable relation-
ships to money stock and (2) is easiest for the Desk
to trackin its day-to-day operations. The first criterion
concerns the selection of a target path for the reserve
aggregate. The second criterion concerns how well the
Desk can stay on that path.18
Choosing a Growth Path for an Operating Target —
Although the Federal Reserve has not made public the
method used in selecting the RPD path, there are
at least two ways this path could be chosen. One
approach would be to predict the RPD-money stock
multiplier, a procedure very similar to the one dis-
cussed in this paper- The simulation of this money
stock control procedure was repeated wherein an
RPD-money multiplier was predicted in the same
maimer as a base-money multiplier. Not seasonally
adjusted RPDs were used as the control variable
instead of not seasonally adjusted net source base.
The results with RPDs were substantially worse. For
example, the root mean square forecasting error for
money over the 1964-71 period svas $1.60 billion
using RPDs, compared to $1.07 billion with the net
source base as the control variable.
‘2Deposits subject to reserve requirements include all time
and savings deposits, and net demand deposits, which are
defined as total demand deposits less cash items in process
of collection and demand balances due from domestic com-
mercial banks. Net interbank demand deposits include all
demand deposits due to domestic and foreign commercial
banks and due to mutual savings banks, less demand bal-
ances due from domestic commercial banks. In the April
1972 revision of the reserve series, net interbank deposits
were revised to reflect the netting of a portion of cash
items in process of collection against interhank deposits,
Formerly, all cash items were netted against other private
demand deposits.
3
See Charlotte E. Rnehling, “RPDs and Other Reserve
Operating Targets,” this Review (August 1972), pp. 2-7.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1972
An alternative procedure stresses that RPDs are
reserves used to support private member bank de-
posits, one component of which, member bank private
demand deposits, is a part of the money stock. This
alternative first takes a projected value for GNP over
the forecasting horizon. It then assumes that the
effect of alternative growth rates of money on financial
conditions could be worked out without any effects on
GNP during the forecasting period. A relationship
between M1 and interest rates is then developed,
and this relationship, along with other factors, is used
to project a pattern of member bank time, demand,
government, and interbank deposits}4 From these re-
sults a path for RPDs could then be developed.
RPDs canbe determined in the following expression:
RPDs = TR — ri)
0
— rDmB = ri) + r
t
T + ER
where TR = total member bank reserves
D°= member bank U.S. Government demand
deposits
i)IB = member bank net interbank demand deposits
D = member bank private demand deposits
T = member bank time deposits
ER = excess reserves
= reserve requirement against D°,D, i)ma
rt = reserve requirement against time deposits
Therefore, to select a path for RPDs consistent with
the member bank demand deposit component of the
money stock (D), which, given the projected values
of the currency and nonmember bank deposit com-
ponents of money, would result in the desired money
stock, requires that the Federal Reserve estimate the
path of time deposits (T) and member bank excess
reserves (ER). At present there are no means to
evaluate how accurately the Federal Reserve can
make forecasts of the nonmember bank deposit com-
ponent of the money stock, currency, member bank
time deposits, and excess reserves.
Predicting the relationship between any reserve ag-
gregate and the money stock involves explicitly or
implicitly predicting a multiplier relationship. There-
fore, some evidence on the stability of the overall
relationship between RPDs, other reserve aggregates,
and money can be obtained by comparing the stabil-
ity of the multiplier relationships. An examination of
regressions relating the current values of the RPD-
money multiplier and the net source base-money mul-
tiplier to a lagged 3-month moving average of these
multipliers did not provide any basis for conjecture
T4
For a discussion of this type of procedure see Steven H.
Axilrod and Darwin L. Beck, “Role of Profections and
Data Evaluation with Monetary Aggregates as Policy Tar-
gets,” (paper prepared for Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Conference on “Controlling Monetary Aggregates II: The
Implementation”).
that there has been a more stable relationship be-
txveen the money stock and RPD5 than between the
net source base and moneyY
These results are not conclusive evidence on the
relative predictability of base-money relationships
versus RPD-money relationships. There may exist a
method of relating RPDs to money which past evi-
dence indicates would have permitted the Federal
Reserve to have more accurately predicted the effect
of an RPD target on money than the results in this
paper indicate for a base target. Also, there may be
other money stock control procedures in which both
the net source base and RPDs perform better.
Tracking an Operating Target — The second cri-
terion for selecting an operating target concerns the
information required by the Desk to track its reserve
aggregate on a daily basis. RPDs require information
that would appear to be considerably more difficult
to project than the net source base data. Referring
to the previous formula for RPDs, it can be seen that
the following have to be estimated to track RPDs:
Government demand deposits, interbank demand de-
posits, member bank borrowings, currency demands
of the public and nonmember banks, and float.’6 Re-
ferring back to Table I, it can be seen that all the data
for tracking the net source base comes from the daily
records of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The
most troublesome component on a daily basis, which
is common both to RPDs and net source base, would
be Federal Reserve float.’7
l5The regressions used the appropriate reserve aggregate
multiplier as the dependent variable and a 3-month movin
average of past values of the multiplier and the lagge
percent change in the Treasury bill rate as independent
variables. The sample period was 1986-71. Since RPDs,
nonbomrowed reserves, and total reserves include only mem-
ber bank reserves and exclude currency, these multipliers
were computed on the basis of the member bank com-
ponent of the money stock. The base-money multipliers
were computed on the basis of the total money stock,
All equations were mu with seasonally adjusted data. The
coefficients of variation show that the standard error of
estimate is much larger relative to the mean of the RPD
multiplier than for the base multiplier. These results are
shown in detail in the complete version of this paper to
be published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
‘~RichardG. Davis discusses the characteristics of short-run
operating targets in “Short-Run Targets for Open Market
Operations,” Open Market Policies and Operating Proced-
ures — Staff Studies (Washington, D. C.: Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, 1971), pp. 37-69.
Fle points out additional difficulties that may arise when, in
addition to the operating transactions, behavior of factors
such as Treasury deposits at commercial banks must be
forecast and other factors such as member bank borrowing
and excess reserves, which are functionally related to open
market operations, must be forecast
‘
7
Proposed changes in the Federal Reserve’s check collection
procedures are expected to reduce substantially the average
level of Federal Reserve float, from about $3 billion to
around $1 billion. The only sizable component that would
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A simple procedure for determining the effect on
the money stock of setting the net source base at a
given value was presented. This proposed method
was not intended to be the definitive answer to the
money stock control problem. It does, however, pro-
vide a useful framework within which several aspects
of money stock control can be analyzed.
remain would be transportation float. One would expect that
even this component would be predictable, within limits,
by monitoring such factors as weather conditions and rail
or truck strikes. For a discussion of this change, see “Recent
Regulatory Changes in Reserve Requirements and Check
Collection,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (July 1972), pp.
626-830.
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Thc results of simulating the procedure over an
S-year period suggest that, using a method for fore-
casting the net source base-money multiplier which
relies only on past, known data, the Federal Open
Market Committee could exercise close control over
the trend growth of the money stock. The simulation
results indicate that errors resulting from using this
method to detennine the effect on the money stock of
setting the net source base at a given value do not tend
to accumulate, signifying that use of this procedure
would not result in “loss of control over money” for a
prolonged period. An analysis of errors for 3-month
moving averages and periods of marked shifts in pol-
icy support the conclusion that the growth of the
money stock could be set at about the rate desired by
the Federal Open Market Committee.
4’
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APPENDIX
Monthly Forecasting Errors of the Money Stock Control Procedure: 1964-1971
(Dollar Amounts in Billions)
Forecasted Actual Forecasted Actual Forecasted Percent
NSA NSA SA SA Minus Forecasting
Date Multiplier Multiplier Money Money Actual Error’
1984 J 2.949 2.943 $154,409 $154100 $ .309 0.2%
F 2,924 2.906 155.470 154.500 .970 0.6
M 2.885 2.871 155.772 155.000 .772 0.5
A 2.906 2.896 155.714 155.200 .514 0,3
M 2.851 2.836 156.708 155.900 .808 0.5
J 2.835 2.823 157.055 156.400 .655 0.4
J 2.816 2.832 15a573 157.500 —.927 —0.6
A 2.828 2.834 158.072 158.400 —.328 --0.2
S 2.850 2.850 159.096 159.100 —.004 0
O 2.873 2.871 159.851 159.700 .151 0.1
N 2.896 2.873 161.573 160.300 1.273 0.8
D 2.885 2.879 160.829 160.500 .329 0.2
1965 J 2.925 2.921 161.113 160.900 .213 0,1
F 2.888 2.869 162.308 161.200 1.108 0.7
M 2.848 2.852 161.473 161.700 —.227 —0.1
A 2.878 2.882 161.759 162.000 —.241 —0.1
M 2.822 2.807 163.111 162.200 .911 0,6
J 2.801 2.813 162.403 163.100 —.697 —0.4
J 2.805 2.805 163.663 163.700 —.037 0
A 2.802 2.803 164.149 164.200 —.051 0
S 2.816 2.836 164.001 165.200 —1.199 —0,7
o 2.847 2.848 166.326 166.400 — .074 0
N 2.866 2.848 167.919 166.900 1.019 0.6
D 2.865 2.861 168.217 168.000 .217 0.1
1966 J 2.902 2.903 169.122 169.200 — .078 0
F 2.861 2.850 170.374 169.700 .674 0.4
M 2.834 2.850 169.544 170.500 —.956 —0.6
A 2.866 2.886 170.520 171.700 —1.180 —0.7
M 2.813 2.805 172.023 171.500 .523 0.3
J 2.812 2.819 171.245 171.700 —.455 —0.3
J 2.814 2.763 174.146 171.000 3.148 1.8
A 2.802 2.765 173.405 171.100 2.305 1.3
S 2.804 2.779 173.421 171.900 1.521 0.9
o 2.792 2.778 172.215 171.400 .815 0.5
N 2.807 2.769 173.502 171.200 2.302 1.3
D 2.774 2.782 171.210 171.700 —.490 —0.3
1967 J 2.816 2.785 173.290 171.400 1.890 1.1
F 2.727 2.734 172.748 173.200 --.452 —0.3
M 2.703 2.753 171.626 174.800 —3.174 —1.8
A 2.745 2.774 172.289 174.100 —1.811 —1.0
M 2.687 2.726 173.301 175.800 —2.499 —1.4
J 2.718 2.753 175.085 177.300 —2.215 —1.2
J 2.717 2.741 177.084 178.700 —1.616 —0.9
A 2.738 2.746 179.222 179.800 — .578 —0.3
S 2.772 2.763 181.488 180.900 .588 0.3
o 2.779 2.771 182.198 181.700 .498 0.3
N 2.777 2.774 182.593 182.400 .193 0.1
D 2.790 2.793 182.872 183.100 —.228 —0.1
1988 J 2.826 2.811 184.870 183.900 .970 0.5
F 2.767 2.746 186.351 184.900 1.451 0.8
M 2.757 2.755 186.003 185.900 .103 0.1
A 2.787 2.794 186.089 186.800 —.511 —0.3
M 2.725 2.749 186.888 188.500 —1.612 —0.9
J 2.764 2.766 189.922 190.100 —.178 —0.1
J 2.737 2.752 190.322 191.400 —1.078 —0.6
A 2.746 2.740 192.960 192.500 .460 0.2
S 2.769 2.764 193.727 193.400 .327 0,2
O 2.779 2.762 195.518 194.300 1.218 0.6
N 2.771 2.781 195.289 196.000 —.711 —0.4
D 2.797 2.812 196.383 197.400 —1.017 —U.S
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Forecasted Actual Forecasted Actual Forecasted Percent
NSA NSA SA SA Minus Forecasting
Date Multiplier Multiplier Money Money Actual Error
1
1969 J 2.841 2.833 $198937 $198400 $ .537 0.3%
F 2.783 2.784 199.432 199.500 — .068 0
M 2.797 2.802 199.909 200.300 — .391 —0.2
A 2.832 2.834 200.867 201.000 —.133 —0.1
M 2.783 2.749 203.870 201.400 2.470 1.2
J 2.776 2.783 201.692 202.200 —.508 —0.3
J 2.767 2.784 201.666 202.900 —1,234 —0.6
A 2.760 2.753 202.933 202.400 .533 0.3
S 2.774 2.774 202.746 202.700 .046 0
O 2.773 2.776 203.022 203.200 —.178 —0.1
N 2.773 2.764 204.133 203.500 .633 0.3
D 2.794 2.776 204.991 203.700 1.291 0.6
1970 J 2.801 2.806 205.126 205.500 —.374 —0.2
F 2.745 2.736 205.371 204.700 £71 0.3
M 2.748 2.757 206.048 206.700 — .652 —03
A 2.787 2.777 209.043 208.300 .743 0.4
M 2.725 2.715 209.750 209.000 .750 0.4
J 2.755 2.736 210.799 209.400 1.399 0.7
J 2.728 2.732 210.027 210.300 —.273 —0.1
A 2.709 2.700 212.295 211.600 .695 0.3
S 2.734 2.709 214.761 212.800 1.961 0.9
o 2.714 2.725 212.179 213.100 —.921
N 2.722 2.732 212.852 213.600 —.748 —0.4
D 2.741 2.744 214.553 214.800 — .247
1971 J 2.765 2.741 217.184 215.300 1.884 0.9
F 2.687 2.690 217.425 217.700 —.275 —0.1
M 2.696 2.705 218.929 219.700 — .771 —0.4
A 2.730 2.732 221.044 221.200 —.156 —0.1
M 2.690 2.679 224.688 223.800 .888 0.4
J 2.705 2.718 224.401 225.500 —1.099 —0.5
J 2.722 2.714 228.057 227.400 .657 0.3
A 2.699 2.703 227.683 228.000 —.317 —0.1
S 2.707 2.697 228.426 227.600 .826 0.4
o 2.711 2.699 228.705 227.700 1.005 0.4
N 2.710 2.700 228.505 227700 .805 0.4
D 2.720 2.715 228.624 228.200 .424 0.2
Forecasted — Actual x 100
Actual
NOTE: SA and NSA refer to seasonally and not seasonally adjusted data, respectively.
Summary Results
Levels 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Mean Square
Forecasting Error $4747 $4359 $22479 $26592 $8710 $8942 $8299 $7744
Root Mean Square
Forecasting Error 6890 .6602 1.4993 1.6307 .9333 .9458 .9110 .8800
Summary Results for Selected Periods
Levels 1964-1971 1966-1971 1969-1971 1970-1971
Mean Square
Forecasting Error $11483 $13795 $8328 $8021
Root Mean Square
Forecasting Error 1.0718 L1745 .9126 .8958
Mean Error .1404 .1114 .2743 .2865
Absolute Mean Error .8273 .9220 .7379 .7725
Percent
Forecasting
Error 1964-1971 1966-1971 1969-1971 1970-1971
Mean Error .0760% .0514% d306% .1375%
Absolute Mean Error A469 .4875 3528 .3625
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